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Abstract
Riset ini bertujuan untuk mengevaluasi informasi politik yang 
disajikan Harian Kompas dan Mingguan Tempo selama periode 
kampanye Pemilihan Presiden 2009. Sejauh mana informasi 
politik tersebut bisa membantu pemilih untuk membuat keputusan 
secara rasional? Temuan pokok penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa 
dari segi kuantitas, hanya sedikit berita kampanye yang memuat 
isu kebĳ akan yang ditawarkan para kandidat presiden. Dari 
jumlah yang sedikit ini, isu kebĳ akan yang disentuh oleh kandidat 
presiden pun rendah kualitasnya. Tidak ada proposal kebĳ akan 
yang didasarkan pada data memadai, yang ditopang dengan 
justifi kasi yang meyakinkan, dan disertai cara pencapaian tujuan. 
Berita-berita tentang kampanye ini tidak cukup untuk membantu 
pemilih untuk memilih secara rasional. Namun rendahnya kualitas 
informasi politik itu lebih bersumber pada kandidat, bukan pada 
medianya.
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Introduction 
Politicians and mass media play a crucial role in structuring 
political competition, defi ning content of competition, and building types 
of linkages between parties or candidates and voters. By selling particular 
issues during campaigns, they galvanize social cleavages to be active 
politically. The campaign period of 2009 presidential election can give us 
an opportunity for seeing how the two actors exercise such a role. 
On May 19 2009, Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto made a declaration 
in front of public to run as candidates for president and vice president. 
“We are a representation of Indonesia,” went their claim. This claim had 
its weight since the incumbent Yudhoyono and his new running mate 
Boediono are both from Java. Jusuf Kalla is from Celebes (Sulawesi) and a 
Bugisnese, while Wiranto is from Java, a Javanese. 
The ethnic and geographic divisions have long been a feature 
of Indonesian politics. Some politicians have o" en politicized Javanese 
versus non-Javanese or Java Island versus outer islands to get a political 
edge over the other. So it is not surprising when Kalla and Wiranto tried 
to make use of ethnic-based issues to outpace the incumbent in winning 
political supports.
One week later, on May 25 2009, Justice and Prosperous Party 
(PKS), via Zulkiefl imansyah, voiced its concern publicly that a sizable 
cadres and sympathizers of PKS could possibly give their votes for 
Jusuf Kalla. The reason spelled out by Zulkiefl imansyah was because 
Yudhoyono’s wife, Kristiani, did not wear jilbab. Meanwhile, Mufi da, the 
wife of Jusuf Kalla did. 
Zulkielimansyah’s statement had ignited a political ripple among 
PKS leaders for the fact that PKS itself previously signed a pact that it 
would endorse Yudhoyono. The ripple had turned into a tidal wave when 
the other candidates exploited the issue, a$ acking Yudhoyono for not 
representing the Indonesian Islamic community.
In the meantime, another pair of candidates Megawati of PDIP and 
Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra declared themselves as the defender of the 
interests of lower class and constantly a$ acked the incumbent, accusing 
the incumbent for betraying lower class and national interests. To make 
it convincing, when declaring themselves as another pair of candidates, 
they chose a dumping site for building their image. Just like ethnicity, 
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religious and class issues can be capitalized by the aspiring presidential 
candidates to win the heart of Indonesian voters. 
Then the media comes to the mix. The work of modern democracy 
is inconceivable without the media. Due to its size, mass media informally 
perform an intermediary function that connects politicians, political 
parties, and the citizens. 
Our research question then can be stated as follows: how do the 
media cover the campaigns made by the candidates? how much is it that 
the media focus on particular issues and overlook other issues? Do they 
focus more on religious and ethnic issues more than on policy issues? 
how deep do candidates explore policy issues?
Voting Behavior and Campaign Strategy
Standard textbooks usually list three major theoretical models of 
voting behavior: sociological, psychological, and rational choice models 
(see, e.g., Niemi and Weisberg, 2001; Roth, 2008). Sociological model, 
introduced in 1950s by scholars from Columbia University, believes that 
sociological factors shape voters’ behavior. Social and economic status, 
domicile, and religion are all believed to determine voters’ choice of 
political party or candidate.
Diff erent from the sociological model, psychological model sees 
that sociological factors can only remotely drive the behavior of individual 
voters. This model concurs that voters’ identifi cation with a political party 
is the most important factor in voting decision. And this identifi cation is 
shaped through then process of socialization in a family. It is very likely that 
if a parent develops his emotional bound with a party (and a candidate) 
the children will likely to adopt that choice. The Michigan scientists who 
developed this model strongly believe that this is the immediate factor 
that determines voters’ political choice.
The third model, the rational choice model, comes with a very 
diff erent idea. First, this model assumes that voters are rational. They 
defi ne voter rationality in terms of material interest. As long as a party or 
a candidate can connect their programs with the material interest of voter, 
the party or candidate can win voter’s political support. The party’s or 
candidate’s program becomes the key of winning elections. In the process 
of signaling game, a voter can retrospectively assess the party and the 
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candidate of his or her choice by looking at then party or candidate past 
track record. It can also be that a voter vote prospectively by looking at 
the policy proposal off ered by a party or a candidate.
The three models provide diff erent implications as to formulating 
a campaign strategy – thus the type of information that can be reported 
by the media. A party or a candidate may delineate a campaign strategy 
that exploits ethnic, religious, and regional identities for winning political 
support. It can also happen that a party or candidate may be more 
convinced that party identity is the crucial factor that determines voters’ 
choice so he or she may put emphasis on his or her party identity in their 
campaigns. Alternatively, for rational voters, a policy issue is seen as more 
important. With a belief that most voters are rational, a party or a candidate 
may present programmatic appeals to voters during campaign. 
In this situation, there are two possibilities for the media to play 
their role in an election process. First, the media can simply and passively 
become a mirror through which the political information is captured and 
delivered to their audience. Second, within their ethical confi nes, the 
media may actively engage in the political process and defend for public 
interests. 
Deliberative aspect. This research goes further by exploring and 
examining the quality of information delivered through the media. It does 
not stop at identifying message’s a$ ributes externally a$ ached to it. But it 
is carried out by dissecting the content of information to explore its depth. 
This way, we will be able to see whether campaign messages – as reported 
by journalists – are deep enough so that it can enlighten voters in making 
a well-informed voting decision and a well-informed political judgment 
(Fishkin, 1991; Page, 1996). 
The deliberative theory of decision making can provide us an 
analytical Framework that meets our need. The crux of the theory rests 
on the assumption that a good argument is the most important element in 
the process of decision making. A rational voter is most likely to choose 
a be$ er argument over a lame one; a strong argument over a weak one. 
What is a stronger argument, eventually?
The quality of argument can be classifi ed into four categories: 
argument with no justifi cation, with inferior justifi cation, qualifi ed 
justifi cation, and with sophisticated justifi cation. The criteria for each 
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category are defi ned as follow (quoted directly from Steiner et.al., 2004: 
57, added with additional adaptation):
• No Justifi cation: “A speaker only says X should or should not 
be done, but no reason is given.” This can be applied to a policy 
proposal stated by a candidate, and no more. The candidate does 
not provide any reason why the proposal is off ered and why it 
should be prioritized. Or it also applies when the proposal is merely 
a problem statement.
• Inferior Justifi cation: “Here a reason Y is given why X should or 
should not be done, nut no linkages is made between X and Y – 
the inference is incomplete. This […] also applies if a conclusion 
is merely supported with illustration.” In our case, the reason 
that supposedly bu$ resses the policy proposal fail to do so; the 
connection between the two is simply absent or unclear.
• Qualifi ed Justifi cation: “A linkage is made why one should expect 
that the X contributes to or detracts from Y.” The connection between 
X and Y is clear and logical – and for our case – this connection 
between the proposal and the reason is supposed to be presented 
with data.
• Sophisticated Justifi cation: “Here at least two complete justifi cations 
are given, either for the same demands or for two diff erent demands.” 
To apply this criterion, two complete justifi cations can mean two 
diff erent options or policy proposals from which one is shown as 
superior to the other with a complete reason and data to bu$ ress 
the claim. This is where a candidate compare his policy choice to be 
off ered to voters and show that his or hers is superior to the other 
candidates proposals. 
 
It must be noted here that this four categories of argument will be 
used for analyzing the content of the campaign information qualitatively. 
So, it may enable us to assess the quality of the information. 
Media and Public Interest. The connection between mass media 
and public interest is usually captured by two major model of mass media: 
the market model and the public interest model (Croteau and Hoynes, 
2001: 13-24).
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The market model sees the media in the fi rst place as a business 
aff air. Profi t is the main motive that drives the media professional in 
deciding what kind of news and angle should be printed or aired. A high 
quality of journalistic product is possible but it would seconded by the 
profi t motive. 
The public interest model gives a diff erent view. It is public 
interest motive that drives the journalistic work. The concern is how to 
engage public in a public life through journalistic products. In political 
realm, the journalists would likely to supply the public with high quality 
of information so that the public can make an enlightened judgment and 
a well-informed decision.
At this point we see a parallel among the three theoretical 
Frameworks. First, the voting behavior models can give us with an idea of 
how to classify the campaign material into several meaningful categories. 
The candidates and the media may give emphasis more on rational 
issues by off ering a policy proposal; or otherwise, they stress on non-
programmatic issues. The second theoretical Framework, the deliberative 
model, gives us a tool for dissecting the content of the campaigns and 
looking at the quality of argument that goes with their policy proposals. 
And lastly, the public interest model, gives as a basis for evaluating the 
journalistic performance of the media: either they could ignore or defend 
for public interest.
Methodology
This research combines the quantitative and qualitative 
methodology for assessing the journalistic information as conveyed 
by printed media. The quantitative method is used for identifying the 
a$ ributes of the journalistic information; and for this, this research has 
developed a coding scheme. The qualitative method is also used for 
dissecting the content of the journalistic information.
Procedurally, the research begins with applying a process of 
media selection. It chooses Kompas and Tempo – two printed media that are 
known for their excellent journalistic practices. It is followed by selecting 
the edition of both media. Since it focuses on the information related to the 
presidential election, this research limits the editions that were published 
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during the campaign period only. All news and op-ed published in this 
period were then all coded and classifi ed into relevant categories.1
The subsequent step is to assess policy-based campaign only. 
For this purpose, the research utilizes the conceptual tools developed by 
Steiner et al when assessing the depth of an argument. The candidates’ 
policy proposals are then dissected and examined by looking at the depth 
of the argument: whether a policy proposal is deep enough so that we can 
fi nd a justifi cation for the proposal.
The Quantitative Data
It fi rstly aims to provide a bigger picture about the trends of 
journalistic reporting on presidential campaigns. Secondly, it provides a 
basis for qualitative analysis that is carried out in the next section. Six 
descriptive-frequency tables are presented: three of them are tables that 
describe the journalistic aspects of the election-related information while 
the other three are more substantive. For the last three tables, the content 
of the information are coded to substantive categories such as whether an 
item displays candidates’ campaign or not, on which candidates a news 
or an op-ed focuses, and whether or not it presents a policy proposal of 
the candidates.
Journalistic Aspects. The number of cases of news and op-ed 
altogether is 411. It contributes to only 11 percent of all types of news and 
topics, editorial, and opinionated columns combined.2 Kompas, because 
it’s a daily newspaper, predictably has more items than Tempo. It is these 
entire items that were coded. Among these items, as seen in Table 2, only 
3 percent of them are opinion of editor (op-ed). The rest of 97 percent of 
information comes in form of news.
1 A standard journalistic coding such as the categories of type, placement, object, and 
substance of information are all included in the coding scheme.
2 On average, in each edition of Kompas, there are 95 items of information (news and opinion) 
while Tempo comprises 97 items per edition. During the campaign period, there were 35 
editions of Kompas and 5 editions of Tempo. Hence, the sum of all news and editorials is: 
(95x35) + (35x5) = 3715. Thus, the proportion of news and editorials that are related to the 
presidential election is around 411/3715, which is around 11 percent of the total.
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Table 1: Number of Information Coded
Frequency Percent
Kompas 354 86
Tempo 57 14
Total 411 100
Table 2: Distribution of Campaign-based News and Op-Ed
Frequency Percent
Op-Ed 13 3
News 398 97
Total 411 100
These pieces of information were all coded. How o" en did the two 
printed media place the national events such as the presidential election 
in their front page? The choice of editor to put a news item in the front 
page signifi es that the item is a top priority in the view of the editor. 
Table 3 shows that 15 percent of them are placed in the front page. This 
means that at least there was one news item found in the front page – on 
average. 
Table 3: The Placement of News
Frequency Percent
Front Page 62 15
Non-Front Page 336 82
Not Relevant 13 3
Total 411 100
Substantive Aspects. Presidential election off ered journalists many 
aspects of the election to be covered. This research, however, focuses on 
election campaign, so we need to classify all information into two major 
categories: campaign and non-campaign. What this research means by 
campaign is any eff orts made by the candidates to win electoral supports 
from voters. This is a coordinated activity with a single goal of winning 
the election. Thus, it includes campaign teams that helped the candidates 
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promote their causes, engender voters’ sentiment to like or dislike a 
particular candidate, and sell a policy proposal. With this defi nition, we 
include all campaign issues that the candidates and their campaign teams 
raised during the campaign period regardless of whether the campaign 
does not off er any policy proposal. Let’s see the following table:   
Table 4: Distribution of Campaign and Non-campaign Items
Frequency Percent
Campaign 202 49
Non-Campaign 209 51
Total 411 100
 
It is very possible for journalists to fall into bias. A direct way to be 
bias is to give a candidate an opportunity to have more space or airtime in 
the media. But there is more. The choice of angle can also refl ect a bias. For 
a particular candidate, the media use a favorable angle; but for another 
candidate, it gives an unfavorable one. 
These two possibilities can be captured by developing two diff erent 
types of categories. The fi rst type should focuses on the subject of news 
and opinion of editor (editorial); and the second type on the angle and the 
editorializing tendency that is usually placed at the end of a news item. 
Let us see the following table:
Table 5: Which Candidate to Be Covered?
Frequency Percent
JK-Win 58 14
SBY-Boed 62 15
Mega-Pro 63 15
JK-Win and SBY-Boed 7 2
JK-Win and Mega-Pro 2 0
JK-Win and SBY-Boed and Mega-Pro 39 9
None of the Above 180 44
Total 411 100
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Intended or not, Kompas’ and Tempo’s coverage on the three pairs of 
candidates show a balanced coverage in terms of frequency. Each of them 
was presented equally around 14-15% of the total coverage. This means 
that both Kompas and Tempo did justice for the three pairs of candidates.
Table 6: Policy and Non-policy Campaigns
Frequency Percent
Policy 130 32
Non-Policy 281 68
Total 411 100
Table 7: Cross-tabulation Between
Campaign/Non-campaign and Policy/Non-policy
 Policy Non-Policy Total 
Campaign 19 (77)* 30 (125) 49 (202)
Non-Campaign 13 (53) 38 (156) 51 (209)
Total 32 (130) 68 (281) 100 (411)
*) In the parenthesis are the absolute number of information (news and op-ed)
 
The four cells described above are the results of cross-tabulating 
two units of analysis: campaign/non-campaign news and policy/non-
policy news. The fi rst cell, campaign and policy, represents the type 
of news and editorial that cover issues raised by the candidates and a 
policy proposal that comes with it. So this is campaign eff orts made by 
the candidate to connect the candidate with aspiring voters. Typically, 
the connection between the two is built through policy or program. The 
second cell represents the number of journalistic information that covers 
eff orts by the candidate to connect with voters through means or issues 
other than policy or program. It can be religious, ethnicity, candidate 
personality, personal history, or quality of leadership issue. 
As for the third cell, non-campaign crosses with policy, it includes 
journalistic reports that deal with collective problems begging a policy 
solution or presenting a solution but are articulated by the media, not the 
candidates. These journalistic works may demonstrate a function carried 
out by the mass media as a public interest defender. They can come in 
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the form of investigative reports, special reports, or features. The fourth 
cell contain journalistic information that neither representing collective 
interests nor campaigning by the candidates. Out of these four cells, 
we should focus and the fi rst and the third cells. These are the type of 
information that could help voters fi nd relevant information for making a 
good political decision. 
Table 7 above provides a quantitative data on all four types of 
information coded. Policy-based information contributes only 32 percent 
to the total presidential election-related information during the campaign 
period. It is relatively small percentage that only three out of ten news 
items or editorial that deal with policy issue or proposal. Smaller is 
the percentage or number of the candidate campaign that off ers policy 
proposal: 77 items or 19 percent only. The rest, 13 percent of policy-based 
information, was not proposed by the candidates but by the journalists or 
the media.
In short, the candidate tried to reach voters more with exploiting 
emotional appeals than with using programmatic appeals. The question 
is of course: how is the quality of policy-based campaign? 
Qualitative Analysis: How Deep Can We Go?
This section limits its focus on the depth of the information needed 
for making a rational decision by voters. An assumption is made that it is 
necessary for a voter to have a good deal of information about candidates 
and their policies before he or she makes a political choice. The quality of 
information is then the key.
All candidates touched many policy issues during the campaign. 
So, it is understandable when we think about the plurality of interests of 
the society, the candidates try to connect themselves with those all social 
groups. Thus, there is a very wide range of issues: human rights, character 
and nation building, national defense, education, governance, corruption, 
forestry, various economic policy, transportation and infrastructure, 
confl ict and peace, and regional interests and many others.
To anticipate the results of the analysis: in general, the news 
that describes the candidates’ policy proposals – if not all – shows a low 
quality of argument. They are poor in quality in the sense that many of 
them are simply a wish-list. The candidates proposed a policy proposal 
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but without much elaboration. In other words, a policy proposal usually 
comes with no justifi cation. At best, some of them provide a qualifi ed 
justifi cation but none of them present a sophisticated justifi cation. Let us 
take a look at three examples below:
“SBY: The government has protected the Indonesian migrant 
workers”
The presidential candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono believes, the 
government under his leadership has swi" ly taken necessary steps for 
protecting the Indonesian workers working in foreign countries.
He also expressed his optimism that the Indonesian workers in foreign 
countries will be able to improve their skills so that they can get a be$ er 
salary. […]
Furthermore, he stated that it is mandatory for a president to protect and 
defend his citizens. That is why, when an Indonesian foreign worker is facing 
a work-related trouble, the government steps in and handles it swi" ly. […]
(Kompas, June 29 2009).
It has been known that Indonesian migrant workers have faced 
various problems due to their status as foreigners. The problems range 
from their legal status that make them legally vulnerable and prone from 
abuses, being weak when negotiating with their placement agencies, 
experiencing a variety of abuses from their employers, to becoming an 
object of corruption carried out by the personnel of Indonesian embassies 
that should have protected their interests. The importance of the issue 
has only gained prominence because fi nding jobs in foreign countries has 
helped Indonesia reduce the rate of unemployment. 
Thus, it is only logical that the candidates brought up the issue 
in their campaign. It was a policy-like statement however, as shown in 
the citation above, Yudhoyono made a claim that the government has 
protected the Indonesian migrant workers. It also means that what he 
was off ering is a policy continuation – a policy he deemed benefi cial for 
the workers. However, it stopped short in specifying the policy and in 
addressing the current workers’ problems. Instead, Yudhoyono relied 
on a normative justifi cation for his claim by saying that it is compulsory 
for the government to protect its citizens. He also failed to identify the 
Kuskridho Ambardi, How Smart Can We Go? The Quality of Campaign Information in the 2009 ...
263
problems and to connect it with his policy proposal – let alone to supply 
it with relevant data and possible policy options. 
The three paragraph cited above is defi nitely a truncated citation. 
The rest of the report, however, gives no more details of the issue. It 
basically contains journalistic technical information that deals with the 
traveling schedule of Yudhoyono, the number of people a$ ended the 
campaign gathering, and where the next campaign stop was.
This type of campaign was a regular type of campaign. It does not 
exclusively belong to Yudhoyono but also belongs to the other candidates 
as well. Let us see another example – a campaign performed by Jusuf 
Kalla on June 28, 2009:
Jusuf Kalla Will Protect Communal Rights
The Baduy community a$ ended an interactive campaign held by Jusuf 
Kalla in Pasir Ona Stadium, Rangkasbitung, Lebak Regency, Banten on 
Saturday morning.
In that occasion the Baduy members expressed their demand that elected 
president to protect their communal rights by delineating a law on communal 
rights. “We ask the president to initiate a law on communal rights,” said 
Jaro Daniah, a representative of Baduy Community.
Other promises: improving people’s welfare if elected, raises the benefi ts for 
local state apparatuses, national self-reliance, revitalizing the agricultural 
sector by guaranteeing lower prices for fertilizers and seeds, and protecting 
the price of paddy. Also in the promise was a credit for up-starters. […] 
(Kompas, June 29 2009).
Kalla held an interactive campaign during his campaign visit in 
a remote area of Banten where a traditional community namely Baduy 
has lived in that area barely touch with modernity. It is a choice made by 
the community to detach itself from ordinary, modern life and to keep its 
tradition intact. 
The nature of the campaign was supposed to give a room 
for developing a policy proposal. It did provide the members of the 
community to express their concerns before Jusuf Kalla. One of them 
demanded that the government (with an assumption that Kalla would 
win the presidential election) makes a law that would give the community 
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formally an exclusive right for maintaining their tradition. Kalla responded 
with a specifi c promise and other promises.
A promise is a promise but it is not a well-prepared policy proposal 
that would become the basis for a law-making. What was the anatomy of 
the problem and its magnitude? Do other traditional communities have a 
similar problem? What is the core issue that should be tackled in the fi rst 
place? Kalla did not address these questions in a specifi c way. Instead, 
he would rather raise other issues such as the promise of the benefi ts for 
local government apparatuses if elected, the important of self-reliance, 
the revitalization of agricultural sector. Nowhere do we see how Kalla 
made an eff ort of fi nding any common denominator across traditional 
communities that could become the basis of formulating their rights. We 
even do not see any logical connection between the political demands 
leveled by the Baduy with all Kalla’s promises of bringing about prosperity 
for the Baduy. 
It is increasingly clear that Kalla (and Wiranto) had a tendency of 
appeasing the audience who a$ ended his campaigns. When he met with 
substitute teachers with no regular salaries, he gave them his promise to 
make them regulars under the government payrolls accompanied with 
pensions. When he met with village heads he came with an off er that 
Kalla would award them with salaries under government payrolls too. 
It was apparent all those promises were more like an ad-hoc 
strategy for winning electoral support. Whatever a social groups was 
met, he promised to give them more prosperity while it was not evident 
as to how to fi nance his promises. What were the consequences that 
follow his choice if he was elected? There was no discussion about it, and 
consequently there was not any justifi cation for it. Let see another example 
from Prabowo – a vice presidential candidate with whom Megawati 
paired with:
Prabowo: Don’t be misled by Political Slogans
The vice presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto said that all government’s 
policies are no more than political rhetoric or political tricks. They 
[Yudhoyono and Boediono] are simply sell slogans for luring voters for 
them so that they can extend their hold on government. 
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“All government programs such as free education, free healthcare, and cash 
transfer to poor people, are anything but true and well-designed policies 
for eradicating poverty. These programs are more political for buying votes 
than a set of defensible policies.” […] The government practically has done 
nothing, said Prabowo. […]
In one of his campaign stops, Prabowo reiterated his criticism 
to Yudhoyono-Boediono. His a$ ack focused on Yudhoyono-cum-
government programs for poor people that gave them assistance in ge$ ing 
cash transfer, free healthcare, and voucher on lower education. These 
programs, according to Prabowo, were not a well-designed policy. The 
programs deceived lower class people because they were meant to “buy” 
votes of lower class people than were meant to be a sustainable policy 
that could li"  poor people out of poverty. With that criticism Prabowo 
simply tried to undermine Yudhoyono’s credibility by emphasizing that 
Yudhoyono was giving rhetoric only without delineating executable, 
superior policies. 
This campaign a$ ack was not accompanied with an alternative 
policy. So, it was more intended for pushing voters away from Yudhoyono 
but was not followed by an eff ort to lure them voting for Megawati Prabowo. 
In other campaigns, Prabowo launched a$ acks of epic proportion, 
criticizing the incumbent for mortgaging state treasures, selling the 
national interests to foreign countries or multinational corporations, and 
advancing neo-liberal agenda (see, among others, Kompas June 19, 2009: 
“Prabowo: Save National Assets”). But, again, all these criticism did come 
with an alternative policy proposal that squarely addressed the need of 
investment for Indonesia and a viable economic strategy to promote the 
idea economic self-reliance. 
Most of policy-based campaigns carried out by the candidates 
were not deep enough so that voters would be able to make an informed 
judgment before casting their votes. At the poorest presentation of a 
campaign-based policy, the candidates simply made a wish list. But we 
would not fi nd any systematic presentation as to exploring the economic 
or social problem, how to address the problems, and with what policy 
option. The candidates did present a logical connection between problem 
and policy option but did not suffi  ciently discuss the available policy 
options and explain he or she chose one option over the other and 
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equipped the option with solid data. The fi rst type of the policy-based 
campaign constitutes argument with no justifi cation and the second type 
constitutes an argument with complete justifi cation. But these two types 
of policy-based campaigns would barely make critical voters and produce 
a well-informed decision on the side of voters. 
What explains this fi nding? Was it because the candidates were 
more interested in exploiting non-programmatic issues than in luring 
voters with programmatic issues? Was it because the candidates did not 
develop a series of well-designed policy to be off ered to the voters? Or, 
was it the journalists who performed poor professionalism in covering 
the candidates’ campaigns?
If we take a look back to the quantitative data on this ma$ er, we 
have evidence that shows a tendency of candidates to exploit the non-
policy issues in their campaigns more than policy issues. As can be seen in 
Table 6, there was only 32% of the candidates’ campaigns that dealt with 
policy issues. The rest of 68% were non-policy issues. Thus, it was on the 
part of the candidates that explains why their policy-based campaigns 
were poor in quality. 
Kompas and Tempo actually noted the candidates’ tendency. Both 
clearly mentioned in their op-ed during the fi rst week of the campaign 
period that the candidates seemed to lack of programs to be off ered to 
voters. The candidate possibly thought that religious, ethnic, and regional 
sentiments were more eff ective for persuading voters but they did not 
formulate a comprehensive strategy or a set of strategies for addressing 
nation’s daunting problems. Pondering this situation, one op-ed of 
Kompas provides an assessment of the quality of candidates’ programs as 
follows:
Candidate Vision on Education
Sad! It is hard to accept the fact that the campaign teams of the candidates 
present their political visions with too much simplifi cation. 
The formulation of their visions on national education – at least as presented in 
the media – merely touched technical issues such as nationally standardized 
test, elementary education, and budget for education. They mixed up vision, 
mission, strategy and its real implications and consequences. […]
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More than 63 years a" er the independence, we still have not had a 
philosophical basis for our education. We have not developed our educational 
system but school system only. (Kompas, op-ed, June 10, 2009)
The lack of vision and integrated solution marked the candidates’ 
campaign. It is not limited to public campaign forums. In the forum of 
presidential debate the candidates did not engage in a lively debate by 
showing the superiority of his or her policy while exposing the opponents’ 
weaknesses. Instead, they mostly shared a normative goal without 
revealing the policy option that one took and the reasons why that option 
must be taken. Thus the opportunity for public to see well-argued policy 
options simply slipped away. In its original words, Kompas describes the 
situation in its op-ed – an assessment of the presidential debate: “[…] how 
do we assess the debate? As the public had noticed, the “debate” was not 
really a debate. What was performed by each candidate actually was not 
a debate nor dialog, but a monolog. […] (Kompas, June 22, 2009).3
Tempo also provides a similar assessment of the quality of 
the presidential campaigns and debates. Entering the third week of 
the campaign period, the quality of the campaigns did not show any 
progress. The candidates’ campaigns were fi lled with music concerts than 
with programmatic exposures. The same thing happened to the debate 
where the candidates were not passionately involved in substantive 
discussions that enabled audience/voters to have critical information on 
candidates’ policy options. This situation was captures by Tempo through 
its introduction for its special edition4 of presidential election: “What is 
still interesting about the presidential election of 2009? Presidential and 
vice presidential debate showed no passion. The three candidates and 
3 In its July 1 2009 op-ed, Kompas made a summary for the candidates’ vision on multiple 
issues, saying that they had nearly similar visions. As long as the visions deal with 
normative goals, it is understandable if the candidates shared them. However, the 
concern was not supposedly limited to formulating normative goals but it should deal 
with the policy option and the strategy for achieving the goals.
4 In this edition (June 29 – July 5, 2009) Tempo decided to focus on the history that shaped 
the life of the candidates. This decision was made a" er sorting out any possible angles 
that possibly would a$ ract its reader. The policy issues were skipped because Tempo 
did not see that it would a$ ract the readers due to the quality of the policy discourse 
off ered by the candidates.
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their three partners seemed to perform three monologs than a dialog – let 
alone an argumentative debate.” […].
In summary, Kompas and Tempo see that there was nothing much 
to be discussed in regard to the candidates’ takes on many crucial issues. 
The candidates basically failed to convince the public and the media that 
they truly had the capability to formulate a policy option for all problems 
that the nation has grappled with. Thus, we should not expect that voters 
would have suffi  cient information that makes them able to critically make 
a well-reasoned political judgment before making their voting decision. 
Does this mean that voters cannot rely on the information supplied 
by the media in making their critical judgments? What did Kompas and 
Tempo do when they found that the candidates merely made a wish list 
instead of a policy proposal with a sophisticated argument for tackling a 
pressing national problem? To answer these questions we need to explore 
the policy-related information that the media supplied with. 
Technically, under our quantitative scheme, we may identify this 
type of information by crossing the categories of the type (campaign and 
non-campaign) and substance of information (policy and non-policy). The 
cell that contains journalistic information about policy but not a campaign 
is the cell represents the journalists’ work in dealing with critical issues that 
candidates should pay a$ ention to. There is no journalistic information we 
found but they are limited to information specifi cally intended by Kompas 
and Tempo for the presidential election. 
For this purpose, Kompas had created a specifi c section under the 
heading of “Mandat Rakyat” or People’s Mandate for which readers would 
know that the information was directly related to the presidential election. 
More specifi cally, Kompas made four series of investigative reports that 
enabled the candidates as well as the voters to make use of the information 
in making their political decision.5 For the voters, the information could 
help them understand the nation’s problems and assess the candidates’ 
main concern and capability in addressing the problems. Let see the fi rst 
investigative series.
5 Kompas had even made it clear that the investigative reports were for the election 
by giving the title of the series, for example, “Presidential Election and the Regional 
Problems.” (see, Kompas June 23 – June 26, 2009).
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The fi rst report dealt with educational problems facing Papua. The 
fact is that Papua is lacking of educational resources – especially teachers. 
The supply side has always been lower than the demand side. There are 
multiple causes from the geographical challenges such as diffi  cult terrain 
and bad condition of roads to housing problem for teachers. Ironically, 
a huge amount of state funds are available for Papua to develop its 
educational programs. 
The report was deep enough that it gives us an understanding on 
the anatomy of problem, its magnitude, data on the fi nancial resources 
that can be used for solving the problems, and an argument for why this 
problem should be addressed. The report implies that a comprehensive 
educational policy for Papua is badly needed for the fact that the fi nancial 
side for the policy does not really pose any problem. 
With this report readers would likely have a complete picture 
of the regional problems and what kind of policy needed to solve the 
educational problems in that area (no teachers, no student discipline, and 
no housing facility for teachers).6 Within the context of the presidential 
election, voters then can use the information as a base for assessing the 
vision and priority of the competing candidates in dealing with such 
kind of problem. We therefore can expect that the voters can make a well-
informed political decision.
In the last series, Kompas, again, 
The Declining Sources of Rice
Some twenty years ago, the young Asep Rukiyat (now, 52) could be proud 
of being a son of one of the richest farmers in East Rancaekek, Rancaekek 
County, Bandung Regency, West Java. His late father, Rokhaendi, was the 
owner of paddy fi eld as wide as 8 acres.
6 In the second series Kompas described a diff erent set of problems that Kalimantan 
is facing (see, Kompas, June 24 2009). A similar quality of report would make well-
informed readers – a process needed to create critical voters. Diff erent from Papua, 
Kalimantan is facing double trouble for the fact that environmental degradation has 
come to a seriously critical point. This series report indirectly gives a contrast between 
the harsh reality that the workers have to deal with and the normative response made 
by Yudhoyono in his campaign as previously discussed.
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But Rukiyat can no longer be proud it. His land, inherited from his father, 
has drastically decreased due to the expansion of the property business, 
industrial development, and toll roads. (Kompas, June 25, 2009)
This news-lead straightforwardly poses a perennial problem of 
land usage in Indonesia, particularly in the rice-producing provinces 
such as West Java. The economic development process has converted 
large chunks of the agricultural areas into industrial complexes and road 
infrastructure. Worse is the growth of population that accompanies the 
process also demands for land conversion. The rate of land conversion is 
alarmingly high with a few predictable eff ects.
For bu$ ressing its claim, Kompas had supplied the report with 
solid data quoted from the Ministry Offi  ce of Environment on the rate 
of land conversion. There was as much as 384, 544 agricultural land loss 
within the time span of two years, from 2005 to 2007. 
The eff ects of land conversion are also specifi ed by the report. 
The declining income of farmers is reported. More importantly, the land 
conversion has caused a sharp decline of rice production in Java. Data 
on the decrease of rice production at the local and provincial level are 
presented. 
Looking at the report, we can conclude that it presented a policy 
proposal with a sophisticated argument. It starts with mapping the 
problem, shows the magnitude of the problem, supplies it with solid 
data, and shows the connection of the causes and the eff ects. At the end, it 
explicitly asks the candidates to handle the problem properly. 
Conclusions
This research aims to assess the quantity and the quality of 
journalistic information as presented in Kompas and Tempo in connection 
with voters’ need of information for making a well-informed voting 
decision. It is expected that both the candidates and the media would 
present such kind of quality information for the voters. Both have a 
similar reason that at the heart of democratic practices voters would likely 
to be rational when it comes to making voting decision. And the quality 
information comes into being when the candidates off er policy-based 
campaigns and the media squarely cover the campaign by emphasizing 
the candidates’ policy programs.
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Our research on the media content show mixed fi ndings. Our fi rst 
fi nding tells us that the candidates and the media were occupied with 
issues other than policy issues. Out of 411 news and op-ed that dealt with 
presidential election, there is only 13 percent that discuss policy issues. 
The rest can be anything about the election but not touches then policy 
issues.
This quantitative fi nding gives a pessimistic view in the sense that 
voters barely can fi nd information that enabled them to vote rationally. A 
qualitative fi nding confi rms the quantitative one.
When dissecting the policy-based campaign/information, this 
research fi nds that the small number of policy-based issue covered by the 
media is qualitative poor. The qualitative analysis shows that most of the 
policy-based information – if not all – does not ever have a sophisticated 
justifi cation. They are generally a wish list of the candidates equipped 
with sporadic normative justifi cation but with no arguments and data 
that can bu$ ress their wishes. At best, intermi$ ently the policy-based 
campaigns give a complete argument without accompanying it with a 
clear policy option.
What is encouraging is that Kompas and Tempo intentionally made 
a variety of journalistic eff orts to provide a series of investigative reports 
that could be used by voters in making a be$ er political judgment and a 
be$ er voting decision. In short, it is the candidates who failed the voters, 
not the media – at least as represented by Kompas and Tempo. *****
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